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Abstract 
This paper critically assesses the globally dominant pattern 
of complex relationship that obtains among mass media, 
market economics, and both cultural and environmental 
change. Making use of Buddhist conceptual resources that 
link the meaning of development, environmental 
conservation and attentional enrichment, the effects of 
consuming mass media commodities are evaluated in ways 
that are compatible with Bhutan’s overarching 
commitments to enhancing Gross National Happiness 
(GNH). 
 
Contemporary media are a complex result of historical 
processes shaped by the interplay of wide-ranging social, 
economic, political, cultural and technological forces and 
systems. Understanding how media affect public culture 
and environmental quality requires gaining critical 
perspective on these processes and the multi-dimensional 
context of their consolidation. Here, I want to focus on a 
particular pattern of connections obtaining among mass 
media, communications technology and market 
economics—a pattern of interdependence that has crossed 
key thresholds of intensity and scale to begin globally 
transforming the quality and directional character of 
attention itself, thereby affecting the very roots of public 
culture and effecting a systematic erosion of environmental 
diversity. 
 
In spite of its complex texture, the broad outlines of this 
pattern of connections can be relatively simply formulated. 
As a result of compounding efficiencies correlated with 
specific advances in transportation, manufacturing and 
communication technology, by the mid-20th century there 
had emerged global markets of sufficient reach and density 
to bring about a commodification of the entire range of 
goods and services needed for basic human subsistence, 
including food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, education, 
sensory stimulation and a sense of belonging.1 In the early 
phases of this process, mass media played a key role in 
coupling markets and consumers by transmitting 
advertising content specifically designed to manufacture 
consumer need. In later phases, positive feedback circuits 
emerged between market growth and media consumption 
that did not depend upon media content performing a 
coupling function.  
 
As a result of advances in communication technologies, the 
scale of media consumption crossed a decisive threshold 
beyond which the explicit content of the media has come to 
be less crucial to furthering market growth and the 
proliferation of consumer needs than the summative effects 
of media consumption as such. The most salient among 
these effects is the mass export of attention from local 
environments, resulting in a depletion of the basic resource 
needed to appreciate or directly add-value to those 
environments, as well as a concomitant impoverishing of 
relational capacities and commitments.   
 
Beyond certain thresholds of reach and density, markets attain 
sufficient complexity to begin producing not only goods and services, 
but also populations in need of them—populations that experience 
themselves as living in increasingly elective environments open to and 
                                                          
1 This list of subsistence needs combines the customary triad of 
food, clothing and shelter with four other basic needs that are 
derived from a range of Buddhist teachings, including those 
referring to the “four nutriments” and the minimal level of 
material support needed to sustain a spiritual practice. Failure 
to meet of any one of these seven needs for very long seriously 
compromises quality of life. 
yet also in deepening need of management or control. For individuals 
in such populations, opportunities for differing multiply geometrically, 
but those for truly making-a-difference to and for one another contract. 
Expanding powers for exercising (consumption mediated) freedoms-
of-choice come at the cost of diminishing strengths for relating-
freely.2 
 
These are very strong claims. They suggest that 
contemporary mass media are implicated in a complex 
pattern of interdependencies that compromise appreciative 
and contributory virtuosity, degrade immediately 
experienced environments and ecologies, and foster the 
systematic translation of locally vibrant patterns of cultural 
and environmental diversity into mere variety. If valid, 
contemporary media must be seen as having come to exert 
a potent and yet practically invisible, corrosive effect on 
public culture. 
 
This will come as unwelcome news for those inclined to see 
the media as a potentially powerful forum for developing 
national-scale Bhutanese public culture and as an efficient 
means of widely promoting environmental conservation. For 
those who have seen the media—and especially the new 
media emerging at the developmental edge of 
communication technology—as vehicles for expressing 
differences and resisting hegemonic social, economic, 
political and cultural forces, they are likely to be seen as 
claims hardly worth countenancing. At the root of such 
hopeful visions of the interplay of media and public culture 
                                                          
2 Here, “power” indexes ability to determine situational 
outcomes; “strength” indexes capacity for opportune situational 
engagement. Power enables winning whatever “game” is being 
played, be it social, economic, political or cultural. Winners are 
accorded further power. Strength enables playing whatever 
“game” is being played in such a way as to keep all players 
interested and involved. Where power implies having relatively 
greater freedom-of-choice than others, strength implies having 
the resources needed for relating-freely with others.  
is the presupposition that the media and their underlying 
technologies are essentially value-neutral—the conviction 
that neither the media nor their technological infrastructure 
in any way determine or prescribe their uses or their social, 
economic, political and cultural effects.  
 
In what follows, I hope to show that matters are not so 
simple. Media, global markets and the technologies that 
make them possible jointly express a sustained 
commitment to values, intentions and practices—in 
Buddhist terms, a karma—that occasions a complex of 
outcomes and opportunities which poses particular 
challenges to realizing the deepening capacities-for and 
commitments-to equity and diversity that are at the heart of 
Bhutan’s GNH-oriented public policy. 
Technology and Media 
The crucial role of technological change in the emergence of 
contemporary mass media is incontestable, and many media 
historians and critics have rightly granted a central role in their 
emergence to advances in communication technology. Most 
obviously, technological change made available vastly greater 
powers both for the mass duplication of communications 
content and for its geographically expanded mass distribution. 
The leap of printed daily and weekly newspapers from local to 
regional and national scales of distribution, for example, 
required both greatly increased unit production and greatly 
expanded means of reliable and rapid automotive and rail 
transportation. Radio broadcast, likewise, made possible vastly 
amplified audiences for live public commentary, music 
performances, and both scripted and improvised dramatic 
entertainment. 
 
Less obviously, perhaps, but no less importantly, advances in 
communications technology also enabled an expansion of the 
sensory reach of the media and a radical extension of their 
potential content. Abstract, nominally visual media like print 
were first augmented by lithographic illustrations and still 
photography that allowed the presentation of relevant visual 
information/images and not just linguistic representations of 
them. The advent of audio recording and broadcast radio 
opened the sense of hearing to mass mediation. The invention of 
motion picture film enabled mass kinesthesia and the inclusion 
of gesture-based, non-verbal communication as media content. 
Film, television, and more recently computer-based gaming 
enable the merging of visual, audio and kinesthetic content to 
bring about potentials for mass-mediated emotional stimulation 
and interactive imagination. Although we are perhaps decades 
away from full-sensorium mass media, that is certainly the 
dream of those pushing the communication technology 
envelope: the creation of convincingly “real” mass-mediated 
virtual environments. 
 
The contemporary scale and scope of mass media can, with 
considerable plausibility, be seen as a direct result of 
technological development. But technology itself is not an 
autonomous domain. Its development is closely allied, if not 
essentially alloyed, with changes taking place in the social, 
economic, political and cultural dimensions of contemporary life 
and, even more importantly, within emergent interdependencies 
among them. Thus, while it is entirely natural to begin a 
discussion of the impact of media on public culture by reflecting 
on technological conditions that have enabled them to take on 
the shape and scale that they have, the discussion needs also to 
take into account the larger, truly global patterns of historical 
development in which the rise of mass media has played a 
particularly complex and crucial role. 
Evaluating Technologies on the Basis of Tool Use: A 
Category Mistake 
As a crucial preliminary to this broader discussion, a key critical 
distinction must be made between technologies and tools. Tools 
are products of technological processes that can be adequately 
evaluated individually, on the basis of their intended, task-
specific utility. If tools do not work or work well, they are 
discarded, recycled or redesigned. Although tools are designed 
with specific uses in mind, flexibility obtains in how they are 
actually used; adapting existing tools to new uses commonly 
precedes the design and manufacture of new tools. Televisions, 
DVD players, radios and internet-connected home computers 
are among the more common consumer tools associated with 
contemporary media; producer tools include audiovisual 
recording equipment, disc manufacturing machinery, radio and 
TV broadcast transmitters, and network routers and servers. 
 
In contrast, technologies are complex alloys of material and 
conceptual practices that embody and propagate distinct 
systems of strategic values. While tools occupy relatively limited 
and precisely located amounts of space, technologies consist of 
emergent, value-laden flows of historically-informed relationship 
saturating wide swaths of the entire spectrum of human 
endeavor. Technologies are not things that can, strictly speaking, 
be said to exist—literally “standing apart” or “taking place” at 
some particular point in space—in service of some task-specific 
utility. Instead, technologies are indefinitely occurring events 
resulting in the generation of new kinds of tasks and embodying 
broad propensities for realizing certain kinds of world or lived 
experience. 
 
Unlike tools, technologies cannot be evaluated on the basis of 
task-specific utility. Indeed, technologies cannot in any strict 
sense be used at all; instead, technologies are engaged in the 
shared conception and promotion of particular interests or ends. 
Technological engagement means consolidating specific patterns 
of strategic valence. Thus, technologies—and the values they 
propagate—can only be effectively evaluated in terms of how 
they affect relational quality and the meaning of the 
interdependencies they establish among the personal, social, 
political, economic, cultural and environmental dimensions of 
our situations as complex wholes. Somewhat surprisingly, 
technologies must be critically appraised in explicitly aesthetic, 
moral and ethical terms. 
 
Important implications attend the ontological difference 
between tools as individually existing things and technologies 
as indefinitely occurring event flows. First, although one can 
refuse to use particular tools and whatever advantages they 
might bestow in carrying out particular tasks, there are no clear 
“exit rights” from the effects of heavily deployed technologies. 
Thus, even those people who elect not to own televisions cannot 
entirely escape the effects of televised entertainment and news 
consumption on public and popular culture; people who elect 
not to own and drive automobiles are nevertheless subjected to 
the polluted air, traffic gridlock and transformations of urban 
space that attend heavily deployed automotive transportation 
technologies. The impacts of a given technology on relational 
quality may be initially greatest for intensive users of tools 
associated with that technology, but eventually these impacts 
become effectively ubiquitous.  
 
A second key implication is that while tools can persuasively be 
depicted as simple problem-solvers, regardless of how many of 
them are in use at any given time, this is not true of 
technologies. Histories of technology suggest that scale 
thresholds obtain beyond which further deployment of a given 
technology begins generating ironic consequences or problems 
of the type that only this technology or its close relatives can 
apparently address. These ironic (or “revenge”) effects 
demonstrate the fallacy in assuming that what is good for each 
of us will be good for all.3 They also demonstrate that 
technologies emerge as higher order complex systems4 on the 
basis of novel compositions of lower level systems of knowledge 
and material practice in novel ways, while at the same time 
exerting “downward causation” on such component systems to 
bring them into better functional conformity with their own 
higher order needs and values.5 
                                                          
3 For a thorough discussion of ironic consequences, see Peter D. 
Hershock, Reinventing the Wheel: A Buddhist Response to the 
Information Age, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1999. 
 
4 To clarify the force of this claim, let me distinguish among 
simple, complicated and complex systems or phenomena. Simple 
systems—for example, an automobile engine or a notebook 
computer—comprise relatively few inert parts or variables. Their 
behavior can be understood in linear causal terms and can be 
accurately predicted and controlled as a sum of the capacities of 
their component parts. Complicated systems—for example, 
ocean currents or traffic flows in a large city—are composed of 
large numbers of simple, interacting, and yet non-adaptive, 
parts or variables. Although the behavior of individual parts 
cannot be accurately determined or controlled, the overall 
behavior of complicated systems remains limited to a sum of the 
capacities of their simple, component parts and can be predicted 
and controlled in probabilistic or statistical terms. By contrast, 
complex systems—for example, living organisms and societies—
comprise significant numbers of interacting and dynamically 
adaptive parts or variables. Complex systems do not simply 
aggregate the characteristics of their component sub-systems. 
Instead, they express qualitatively distinct, recursively-
structured orders that are capable of generating novel behaviors, 
actively incorporating histories of the situational outcomes of 
their own behaviors to shape present and future behavior. In 
sum, complex systems are both auto-poetic (self-making) and 
novogenous (novelty-generating).  
 
5 The notion of “downward causation” is explored at length in 
Peter Bogh Andersen with Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole 
Finnemann and Peder Voetmann Christiansenet edited, 
Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies, and Matter, Aarhus 
 
Confusing tools and technologies, collapsing the important 
ontological differences between them, is to commit a 
particularly ominous category mistake, especially if one errs on 
the side of considering critical assessments of tools to be the 
equivalent of critically assessing the technologies from which 
they are derived. In effect, that is to exempt technologies from 
any appropriate critical regard at all. 
Mass Media as Complex Technological Phenomena, 
not Complicated Tools  
The term “mass media” was first used in the 1920s with the 
advent of national radio broadcasts in the U.S., marking a close 
association of media with technology that continues to the 
present day. “Mass media” is now generally used to refer a 
range of technology-enabled communication systems including: 
print publishing (newspapers, magazines and books); electronic 
broadcast (radio and television, but now also computer-based 
podcasts); the internet; and computer games. These media 
categories are associated with a range of purposes including: 
journalism (the provision of news and information); advocacy 
(the provision of social, political and business/economic 
perspectives and propaganda); entertainment (the provision of 
sensory and aesthetic stimulation); public service (e.g., 
organizing disaster relief); and education. 
 
The alignment of mass media with technology that is evidenced 
by standard categorizations of the media reflects how the media 
are appraised, especially in terms of their impact on the 
dynamics of the public sphere. Unfortunately, however, the 
media have not been understood and appraised as truly 
complex technological phenomena. Rather, they have been 
treated as merely complicated tools that can be evaluated in 
terms of how well they serve the distinct purposes for which 
                                                                                                                   
University Press, Ärhus: 2000 
they are used. In essence, the effects of mass mediation have 
most often been assumed to be a simple, combined function of 
the intentions of those using the media—either as profit seeking 
producers or enjoyment or information seeking consumers—
and the content that mass media deliver. Consequently, the 
public impacts of the media typically have not been assessed 
comprehensively—as I have argued should be the case for any 
technological phenomena—in terms of how they affect relational 
quality and the meaning or directedness of the 
interdependencies they foster.  
 
Seeing the media as tools has deflected critical attention away 
from the media themselves to the commodified goods and 
services passing through them and the reasons that they do so. 
Paralleling the popular argument wielded by the proponents of 
the right to bear arms—“guns don’t kill, people do”—the media 
are generally held to lack any intrinsically determined effects on 
public culture. Whether the media have good or ill effects on 
society depends strictly on who is using them and why. 
 
In sum, mass media for the most part have been critically 
regarded as an essentially neutral interface between media 
users—a means of transmitting messages and not 
communicative systems expressing and/or propagating 
meanings of their own. Media ethics has thus tended to 
concentrate on establishing codes of professional conduct for 
those generating media content (most prominently investigative 
reporters, newscasters, journalists and book authors); on 
building systems for regulating media production and 
marketing (often reflecting stances on censorship and worries 
about market monopolies); and on discerning if, how, and in 
what way specific program contents affect individual media 
consumers (e.g., the effects of violent cartoon programs on 
young viewers) 
 
To be sure, the intentions of media users (both producers and 
consumers) and the communicative content linking them do 
make a difference in how the media affect popular culture, as 
well as other dimensions of the public sphere. The importance of 
program content is evidenced, for example, in strong 
correlations between the consumption of violent media and 
social violence.6 The proven success of mass mediated 
advertising and the successful use of television as a propaganda 
tool in—to illustrate both ends of the “propaganda” spectrum—
both Hitler’s Germany and contemporary American presidential 
election campaigns leaves little doubt as to the relevance of 
intention in the public impact of the media. Nevertheless, the 
effects of program content and producer/consumer intent do 
not exhaust the full range of media effects on the dynamics of 
the public sphere. Indeed, granted that technologies arise as 
complex and value-laden relational flows that pervade both the 
personal and the public spheres, and that their effects are not 
restricted to those making direct use of tools associated with 
them, it may well be critically counterproductive to focus 
exclusively on media users—those whose communication and 
information needs are being adequately met, and perhaps 
shaped, by the increasingly refined tools of mass mediation. 
 
In the following section, I want to sketch out the relational 
terrain linking mass media and market economics. The point of 
this is to open for consideration the possibility that, as important 
as the mediating effects of content and intent are, they 
                                                          
6 A summary of scientific findings on media and violence, as well 
as media misinformation about these findings, can be found in 
Brad J. Bushman and Craig A. Anderson, “Media Violence and 
the American Public: Scientific Facts Versus Media 
Misinformation,” in the American Psychologist, June/July 2001. 
An interesting work focused on the role of unconscious imitation 
in media consumption is Susan Hurley’s “Bypassing Conscious 
Control: Media Violence, Unconscious Imitation, and Freedom of 
Speech,” in Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? An 
Investigation of the Nature of Volition, edited by S. Pockett, W. 
Banks, and S. Gallagher, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. 
ultimately may be dwarfed by the systemic effects of the media 
as complex, value-laden technological phenomena that have 
emerged through, and helped to both sustain and direct, a 
particular pattern of interdependencies among modern (and 
now postmodern) social, economic, political, and cultural 
practices and forces. 
The Bigger Picture: Market Realities and the 
Emergence and Flourishing of the Media  
It has been said that the only thing more certain to hamper the 
advance of critical understanding than generalizations is the 
failure to make them. The aerial views afforded by 
generalizations are notoriously short on detail, passively 
obliterating differences that at ground level may be profoundly 
important. At the same time, however, their broader horizons 
make possible both a significant expansion of what might be 
considered relevant and an almost paradoxical sharpening of 
detail with respect to large-scale patterns. Comprehensively and 
critically understanding mass media and their current and 
potential shaping of public culture requires systematically 
reckoning with how the media’s historical evolution has affected 
and been affected by large-scale patterns of development 
outside of the communication sector. Adopting such an aerial 
perspective on the media will mean glossing over important 
differences in how mass media have emerged and become 
woven into the fabric of day-to-day life in various parts of the 
world.7 But at the same time, it will enable shedding critical 
light on whether those differences might—or might not—be able 
truly to make a difference in how 21st century media affect 
public culture. 
 
Within the overall patterns of events constituting the historical 
                                                          
7 For a collection of essays exploring such differences, see James 
Curran and Myung-Jin Park, edited, De-Westernizing Media 
Studies, New York: Routledge, 2000. 
“terrain” out of which contemporary media have emerged, I 
want to concentrate on four main features. These are: 1] the 
growth of national and global institutions aligned with such 
modern values as universality, equality, autonomy, plurality, 
tolerance, precision and control, which fostered; 2] the 
concurrent evolution of a globally integrated economic system 
that has successfully commodified virtually every aspect of 
human subsistence, thereby; 3] challenging and dissolving 
traditional socio-cultural roles, practices and identities, 
especially those related to direct, mutual contribution to shared 
welfare, to; 4] greatly expand experiential freedoms-of-choice 
and systematically support the fashioning of globally profitable 
elective identities and communities, ironically compromising 
both capacities-for and commitments-to relating freely in the 
realization of a truly diverse and environmentally enriching 
public sphere. 
Modernity and the Advent of a Global Market 
Economy 
Among the most prominent and significant features of global 
history over the past half millennium have been the ideological 
and institutional triumph of modernity and the consolidation of 
globally integrated market activities. Understanding how 
contemporary media affect public culture involves coming to see 
how the media have been implicated in expanding the scope of 
market activity, but also in qualitatively altering the critical 
purchase and practical traction of modern values, inculcating 
postmodern sensitivities-to and celebrations-of difference in a 
technologically enabled reconciliation of tensions between the 
values of autonomy and equality. 
 
In his book, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, 
Stephen Toulmin has argued masterfully against the long 
received view that the birth of modernity and its displacement 
of Renaissance humanism and skepticism resulted from a kind 
of immaculate conception—an intrinsically generated shift of 
basic values and conceptual frameworks. To the contrary, 
Toulmin makes the case that transitioning from the values and 
concept clusters of Renaissance humanism and skepticism to 
those characteristic of modern thought and institutions was of a 
piece with equivalently radical shifts taking place in the social, 
political, economic, cultural and technological domains. These 
shifts, he maintains, occurred as systemic responses to a 
confluence of stresses, within the public sphere, that were 
unique to 17th century Europe and that continued significantly 
to affect the trajectory of global history through most of the 20th 
century.  
 
No less practically than theoretically motivated, modernity 
involved the interpretation of difference as an expression of 
contingency and the canonization of dichotomies asserting the 
primacy of reason over emotion; of mind over body; of the 
written over the oral; of the universal over the particular; the 
general over the local; the timeless over the timely; and the 
logical over the rhetorical. Modernization meant—and continues 
to mean—change based upon the preeminence of a constellation 
of values including: universality, autonomy, equality, 
sovereignty, precision and control. These values ramified with 
particularly apparent force in the realm of politics, setting in 
motion nation-building processes that profoundly revised the 
shape and quality of political space. But, just as powerfully, they 
transformed the dynamics of trade and development. 
 
Global trade is not a strictly modern phenomenon. A quilted 
pattern of exchange relations linked, for example, imperial 
China and imperial Rome from as early as the 1st century CE. 
But global trade began undergoing a series of technologically 
and ideologically driven shifts in the 16th century that, over the 
succeeding three hundred years would bring about the 
realization of a truly global market economy through which 
almost all natural and industrial resources were commodified 
and put into worldwide circulation. Among the key values 
inscribed in and prescribed by these shifts have been: control, 
competition, convenience and choice.  
 
It is useful to identify four major periods in the realization of 
contemporary global markets: the period of colonial economics 
that prevailed from the 16 to the 19th centuries; the period of 
development economics that developed from the 19th century 
through roughly three quarters of the 20th century; the 
information economy that assumed global primacy over the last 
decades of the 20th century; and, most recently, the subtle 
emergence of a media-sustained attention economy.8 These four 
periods can associated with technologically triggered efficiencies 
that dissolved geographic and temporal constraints on the 
expansion of market scale and content, making possible: 1] the 
successive commodification natural resources, labor, 
information and attention; and, 2] the successive extension of 
power over the production and flow of goods, consumption, 
knowledge/human capital, and a sense of belonging or 
meaning.  
 
An important turning point in this process occurred in the late 
19th century. By this time, markets of truly global reach were 
fast maturing, resulting in shortfalls in the velocity of 
consumption required to sustain economic growth. Theorists 
like Thorstein Veblen were, by the end of the century, noting 
that expanding markets mandate expanding consumer bases 
and that limits exist as to how far this expansion can be driven 
by falling prices associated with efficiencies in production and 
transportation. Sustaining growth meant continuously 
increasing the absolute range of goods and services placed into 
global circulation. Beyond a certain scale threshold, the growth 
of overall market activity can only be stably realized through 
                                                          
8 I have described these transitions and their wider contexts in: 
Reinventing the Wheel (op. cit.) nd in Buddhism in the Public 
Sphere: Reorienting Global Interdependence, London: 
Routledge/Curzon, 2006, especially, Chapter 3. 
accelerating rates of consumption. In short, maximally extended 
market reach produces powerful imperatives to maximize 
market density, incorporating entirely new populations (e.g., 
children) and new commodities (e.g., entertainment) within the 
scope of market exchanges. 
 
In effect, increasing the density of market activities involved the 
generation of needs and problems that might be addressed by 
new, market-designed and market-delivered goods and services. 
Under the aegis of added convenience and expanded freedoms-
of-choice, market growth came to be sustained by systematically 
finding fault with the familiar and traditional. Homemade soap, 
for example, was faulted for being “un-hygienic”—produced by 
rendering animal fat wastes—and far inferior to the scientifically 
engineered and “pure” cleaning agents produced by the 
chemical industry. By the mid-20th century, novelty itself had 
been elevated to the status of a selling point. Particularly in the 
U.S., accelerated consumption was successfully sold to the 
public as a means of bringing “the future” into every home and 
neighborhood. 
 
Two major consequences of increasingly dense market activity 
can be noted here. First, economic growth becomes coupled to 
deepening dissatisfaction with things as they have come to be. 
In Buddhist terms, this can be seen as the systematic creation of 
an economy of dissatisfaction rooted in the production of 
papanca or the proliferation of situational blockages—the 
steadily expanding experience of disappointment, trouble and 
suffering (dukkha). Secondly, economic growth becomes 
proportionate to a tightening of the consumption-to-waste cycle, 
which translates into decreasing opportunities for directly 
appreciating or adding value either to the goods and services 
one purchases or to one’s situation as a whole. Beyond certain 
thresholds of market reach and density, growth has a corrosive 
effect on relational quality. This effect is most severe for the 
poor, who are deprived in relative, if not absolute, terms of the 
resources and imagination needed for investment. Economic 
growth, in these terms, becomes systematically impoverishing.9 
 
Mass media have played a crucial role in making this kind of 
economic growth possible. Technological advances in industrial 
production and transportation had, by the beginning of the 20th 
century, enabled the commodification of basic, material 
subsistence needs: food, clothing and shelter. Over the course of 
the century, the needs for medical care, education, sensory 
stimulation and a sense of belonging or meaning were 
successfully subjected to marketization. Mass media were 
important throughout this process. They served first as a means 
of advertising goods and services and creating new kinds of 
needs. Later, they served as forums for broadly shaping and 
setting popular agendas for public policy. Finally, they began 
functioning as almost universally available conduits for 
marketing/distributing sensory, imaginary and intellectual 
stimulation in the form of news and entertainment products and 
programming.10 
 
The development of commercially viable, electronic mass 
communication, from mid-20th century onwards, was especially 
important in bringing about both quantitative and qualitative 
shifts in the relationship among media, expanding market reach 
                                                          
9 I have presented this argument in greater detail in: “Poverty 
Alleviation: A Buddhist Perspective,” Journal of Bhutan Studies, 
Volume 11, Winter 2004, pp. 33-67. 
10 It should be noted, here, that I am working with a Buddhist-
inspired understanding of subsistence needs as those 
“nutriments” required for sustaining human beings as persons-
in-community. It is part of the basic, Buddhist worldview that 
human beings have six sense organs and associated ranges and 
qualities of consciousness: the visual, auditory, gustatory, 
olfactory, tactile and mental. Thus, intellectual stimulation is, in 
Buddhist terms, a form of sensory stimulation. Concepts and 
ideas are, for us, a kind of “food”—a nutriment without which it 
is impossible to lead fully human lives.  
and density, and the erosion of personal and communal 
resources and opportunities for contributing directly and 
significantly to sustainably shared welfare. Here, let me draw 
attention to four phases or aspects of this complex process. 
 
First, because electronic communications technologies were 
instrumental in opening up possibilities for mass producing and 
mass marketing auditory and visual experiences, they 
effectively enabled mass media to circumvent the literacy hurdle 
presented by print media and, in some degree, to perforate the 
language barriers that had hitherto segregated national media 
markets. Among the most readily apparent outcomes of this 
capacity of mass media to penetrate markets worldwide was the 
emergence of global pop music.  
 
Secondly, these new technologies also made possible the 
penetration of mass media into the lives of barely literate and 
pre-literate populations, especially children. The affects of 
television program content and advertising on children’s desires 
and expectations—and subsequently, family consumption 
patterns—has been nothing short of profound. 
 
Thirdly, these new technologies made possible the marketing of 
ephemeral goods—experiences or sensory stimulation as such—
that radically collapsed the consumption-to-waste cycle and 
habituated media consumers to a diet of virtually unbroken 
product streams. An importantly aspect of this was the market-
driven development of user-friendly, inexpensive and highly 
portable media tools (e.g., the original Sony Walkman and the 
new I-Pod) that allowed the consumption of mass media to be 
effectively freed from spatial/geographic constraints. It became 
practically possible to consume media products virtually 
anytime, anywhere. 
 
Finally, the flood of cheap, new media tools combined with 
niche marketed media content to fabulously expand consumers’ 
freedoms-of-choice in managing the content of their (mass-
mediated) experience. In effect, this dissolved tensions between 
the values of autonomy (acting in one’s own individual interest) 
and equality (the combination of difference with an absence of 
explicit hierarchy). Internet technologies, in particular, made 
possible the realization of a virtual public sphere in which—at 
least as claimed by some cyberspace visionaries—every 
individual can exercise the right to pursue whatever he or she 
means by liberty and happiness, making a difference for himself 
or herself without necessarily making a difference to anyone 
else. The widely recognized “digital divide” of inequitable 
access to computer-mediated information and opportunity is 
one shadow of free market media; the digital divide or gap that 
allows individual user choices to occur in almost complete 
isolation is, in terms of public culture, an even deeper and more 
dangerous shadow—a direct threat to diversity understood as a 
function of mutual contributions to sustainably shared welfare. 
Mass Media and the Global Market Sustaining Export 
of Attention 
If the media are viewed as (or, at least, in terms of) tools that are 
used and evaluated by individuals, these “effects” of 
commercially viable mass media can easily be regarded in a 
quite positive light. For any individual, having more choices, for 
example, regarding the content of their day-to-day experiences 
is certainly better than have fewer choices or none at all. 
Whether mass mediated experience is of higher, lower or 
equivalent quality to unmediated experience is, arguably, 
simply a matter of personal opinion or debate. And, as proved 
by the use of the internet to organize social and political 
activism (e.g., the movement advocating alternatives to free 
market globalization), or by the proliferation of non-mainstream 
sources of information and analysis (like Z-Net or the blogging 
phenomenon), the tools that have been used to build global 
markets can also be used to take them to task. 
 
However, if mass media are understood as technological 
phenomena or strategically structured flows of events, then it is 
entirely possible that the sum of all individual stories about 
media use will still not tell us much—at least, not much that is 
critically relevant—about media effects on public culture. 
Critically engaging mass media requires keeping the bigger 
relational pattern in mind. To this end, I want to look at 
attention itself as a form of capital—indeed, the single most 
important form of capital for realizing diverse and caring 
communities, but also one that is circulated by and essential to 
the “health” of the global market economy. 
 
It is often assumed that the overall viability of (especially) 
electronically delivered, commercial mass media is a function of 
how well the costs of producing and marketing media 
commodities are offset by income from their purchase and 
consumption. With media like recorded music or cable 
television, unit charges for individual products or time-based 
charges for access to product streams are a major source of 
income; for media like broadcast radio and television—which 
supply media goods (program content) without any direct 
charges to consumers—costs are largely recouped, and profit 
generated, through advertising sales and related product spin-
offs. The dynamics of the information economy are, in fact, very 
much dependent upon such processes in which flows of 
information and opinion intermingle to form immaterial 
attractors for both production and consumption. 
 
Yet, mass media play a much more important role in global 
economics than that of generating product- or program-
mediated monetary transfers. At present scales of media 
penetration, made possible in large part by technological 
efficiencies that have allowed media consumption to become 
highly individualized, as well as nearly ubiquitous, mass media 
are habituating entire populations to diets of virtually unbroken 
streams of ephemeral entertainment, information and news. 
This signals a systematic and significant export of attention out 
of the environments within which mass media are consumed—
homes, schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, communities, and 
so on. Because this export is occurring in the context of rapidly 
evolving, postindustrial institutions, it does not result in 
obvious, large and lasting accumulations of attention capital. 
The export of attention from here does not result in its apparent 
import elsewhere; it is the entire system of the global free 
market economy that benefits from the flight and circulation of 
attention capital. 
 
Critics of mass media have almost exclusively linked the ill-
effects of mass media on family life, personal development and 
public culture to specific—most notably, violent or sexually 
charged—program content, and these links are quite real.11 But 
                                                          
11 It should be noted that the causality linking media program 
content and society is not linear, but complex and network-like. 
the most widely spread and relationally powerful effects of mass 
mediation center on their role in distracting attention from local 
environments and placing it into contingently structured global 
circulation. Simply stated, time spent consuming mass market 
media is time not spent attending to the needs of one’s family, 
home, neighborhood or local community. In countries with 
mature media markets—the U.S. is, perhaps, the best, though 
not necessarily most extreme, example—time spend in media 
consumption now exceeds a per capita average of 6 hours per 
day.12 This is time not spent developing new relational 
capabilities, not acquiring new skills or refining existing ones, 
not passing on personal or cultural traditions, and not making 
use of locally available resources to meet other basic human 
needs by, for example: cooking, designing and making clothes, 
building or repairing one’s home, caring for the ill, inspiring and 
refining learning activities, creating new works of art, music, 
dance and drama, or participating in public debate, policy 
formation, or democratic governance. In Buddhist terms, mass 
media consumption functions as an asrava or effluence of 
attention-energy into activities that—whatever personal 
enjoyment or sense of freedom they afford—are relationally 
                                                                                                                   
The linkages are, in other words, correlative—a function of 
interdependencies and not one of independent ‘causes’ 
producing dependent ‘effects.’ The policy failure (or irrelevance) 
of research that is critical of the interplay of mass media and 
society is itself very much a function of the rarity with which one 
can find a “smoking gun” in media content. 
12 Americans spend, on average, 4.5 hours per day watching 
television. Internet use stands at about 12-15 hours per week. 
Statistics for radio, video-game, magazine, newspaper and 
recorded music consumption are not readily available, but 
surely add significantly to the total. Even allowing that some 
media—like radio, MP3 products and podcasts—can be 
consumed while engaged (at least superficially) in other 
activities, it is quite conservative to estimate the Americans 
devote roughly one-third to one-half of their waking hours to 
media consumption. 
polluting or wasteful.13  
 
It must be stressed, again, that the ill effects of mass media on 
public culture and the appreciation (or sympathetic resonance 
with and adding of value to) local environments are not a direct 
function of media content. Attention is exported just as 
powerfully by so-called public broadcasting, documentaries, 
and locally produced news or entertainment as it is by 
commercial, global media. It must also be stressed that a 
significant, cumulative effect of massively exported attention 
will be an increasing reliance and, eventually, dependence on 
market designed and market delivered, non-media 
commodities. That is, time spent in media consumption 
effectively mandates the consumption of goods and services that 
otherwise might have been personally produced (and, perhaps, 
traded). Mounting reliance/dependence on market produced 
goods and services leads, first, to a professionalizing of the 
means of production for meeting these needs, then to the 
erosion of local production ecologies, and, finally, to a 
consolidation of highly mobile, profitably rationalized global 
production monocultures.14  
 
From one perspective, this be seen as a means of opening up 
economic opportunity—fostering a transition from a world of 
locally made and used crafts to one of globally circulating 
commodities. Recommending such a transition is a marked 
increase in the number of choices available with respect to 
meeting basic needs, but also—at least at certain points in the 
process of transition—a general increase of quality with respect 
to specific goods and services. But, this same process can be seen 
as trading-off or forfeiting high productive diversity for 
                                                          
13 It is worth noting that, particularly in early Buddhism, the 
elimination of asrava was identified with the attainment of 
ultimate freedom—the realization of liberation from trouble and 
suffering. 
14 See, for example, Buddhism in the Public Sphere, Chapter 3. 
heightened consumption variety—acquiescence to the seductive 
mandates of consumerism. As the attention economy matures—
albeit with considerable unevenness at all geographic scales—
there occurs a proliferation of differences associated, for 
example, with the development of niche markets and new 
domains for the exercise of choice. There is not, however, a 
comparable enhancement of capacities-for and commitments-to 
making a difference. Indeed, an important outcome of the 
individuation of media tool use that fuels the attention economy 
is a shrinking of active opportunities either to differ-with or 
differ-for others.  
 
Beyond a certain threshold of complexity, global market growth 
has the downward causal effect of producing populations in 
need. Consumer needs now span the full spectrum of 
subsistence, including: food, clothing and shelter, medical care, 
education, sensory stimulation, meaning-making and a sense of 
belonging. Mass media consumption, by exporting attention 
capital from homes, neighborhoods and local communities, 
plays an indispensable role in the deepening of consumer 
neediness.15 The complex pattern of values-intentions-actions 
(karma) informing global market economics and the emergence 
of the attention economy yields conditions in which increasing 
opportunities for exercising freedoms-of-choice are coupled 
with lowering opportunities for relating freely in the satisfaction 
of our own needs and in contributing aptly to others.  
 
Ivan Illich’s insight that the commodification of subsistence 
needs invariably leads to the institutionalization of a new classes 
                                                          
15 Among the most striking demonstrations of this neediness is 
the epidemic of boredom afflicting much of global youth—a 
generation that can only with great difficulty bear being “alone” 
or present in a way that is not technologically or commodity 
mediated. The need they experience is not just to be entertained 
or to be present virtually with others, but to be entertained or 
networked with increasing variety and speed. 
of the poor is, here, of signal relevance. By effectively making 
sensory stimulation, meaning-making and sense of belonging 
commodified services to which public has ready access, the 
complex dynamics of the attention economy engender a public 
in need of such services. Simply stated, the growth dynamics of 
the attention economy are relationally impoverishing. 
Mass Mediation and the Conversion of Environmental 
Places to Locations 
It is not possible to accelerate rates of consumption, especially of 
goods and services aimed at meeting, as well as stimulating, 
needs for sensory stimulation, meaning and a sense of 
belonging, without intensifying dissatisfaction with present 
circumstances. Empirical studies on happiness or perceived 
well-being suggest that a threshold exists, beyond which further 
consumption and accumulation of material “wealth” do not 
enhance perceived well-being. On the contrary, evidence 
suggests that accelerating consumption—or tightening the 
consumption-to-waste cycle—at some point begins negatively 
affecting perceived well-being.  
 
Buddhist teachings on karma and consciousness are particularly 
useful in understanding this inverse correlation of increasing 
“wealth accumulation” with a decreasing sense of well-being. 
The Buddhist teaching of karma can, for present purposes, be 
summarized as enjoining insight into the meticulous consonance 
that obtains between values-intentions-actions and the play of 
experienced outcomes and opportunities. Put somewhat 
differently, the teaching of karma encourages realizing that we 
have intimate relationships with the environments in which we 
find ourselves and with all that takes place therein.16 The 
                                                          
16 The karma of global markets and the various economies—
colonial, development, information and attention—that 
historically have been associated with them is, undoubtedly, a 
complex function of many generations of intentional activity, 
informed by historically and culturally distinct constellations of 
consumption of mass-produced, globally marketed commodities 
to meet all of our basic needs, rather than personally or locally 
crafting them, alters these relationships. This is especially the 
case with mass media, which serve the dual purpose of 
providing desirable experiences while extracting attention from 
consumers’ immediate environments. 
 
As noted earlier, shifting from a world dominated by craft to 
one of commodities is not necessarily a bad thing. The 
availability of fruit and vegetables throughout the year can (but, 
as is well know, need not) enhance physical well-being. What is 
crucial, from a karmic perspective, are the values-intentions-
actions in accordance with which our relationships with our 
environments are altered. As a crucial part of the global market 
economy, in addition to their explicit content, mass media also 
promulgate a particular complex of values and, in order to be 
profitable, must also systematically affect patterns of intention 
and action. The pivotal values embodied within global market 
operations are competition, control, convenience and choice. 
Mass media are competitive to the degree that they are able to 
attract and, finally, extract attention—that is, the degree to 
which the consumption of media commodities supplants other 
practices for meeting the basic human needs of sensory 
stimulation and a sense of belonging and meaning. What the 
media offer is convenience, a nearly infinite array of choices, and 
                                                                                                                   
values, flowing together in the gradual articulation of globally 
shared practices and institutions. Just as doubtlessly, however, 
close ties obtain between the patterns of inequity and 
impoverishment associated with contemporary scales and 
depths of globalization and the distinctive modern and market 
values that have largely shaped its dynamics—in particular: 
control, competition, choice, autonomy, equality and 
universality. Human history is always a function of both 
intention-rich personal karma and 
collective/cultural/communal karma in which intentional is of 
largely generic importance and in which the force of values is, 
accordingly, much more prominent. 
almost complete, individual control over the contents of 
experience. 
 
All of these values have liabilities in terms of the cyclic pattern 
of outcomes/opportunities that they generate. Consider choice. 
Choices, in contrast with commitments, do not imply sustained 
involvement. One chooses between two or more things, courses 
of action or experiences. Although it is possible only to choose 
one out of any given range of things, actions or experiences, all 
of them are equivalent as intentional objects that are subject to 
being chosen. We do not have an intimate relationship with 
what we can choose, but rather an entirely contingent one. A 
world in which we have an almost infinite array of choices—like 
that offered by contemporary global media—is a world of things 
that we can instantly possess; it is not a world to which we 
belong, a world to which we give our hearts. The karma of 
continuously expanding our freedoms-of-choice is then a karma 
for being free to not belong, to not commit, to not contribute as 
needed; it is not a karma for enhancing our capacities-for and 
commitments to relating freely. 
 
A distinctive feature of Buddhist thought is that consciousness is 
understood as a quality of relationship constituted by and 
encompassing the interplay of sentient beings and their 
environments. That is, consciousness arises between and 
qualitatively integrates sentient organisms and their supporting, 
sensible environments. From this, it follows that degraded 
environments are necessarily correlated with degraded patterns 
of consciousness. It follows, as well, that degradations of 
consciousness—defined generically, here, as an attenuation of 
attentive virtuosity (samādhi) or the capacity for sustained, 
concentrated and yet flexibly responsive awareness—will also 
necessarily result in environmental degradations. Degradations 
of consciousness will eventually result in being less and less well 
or valuably situated.  
 
This, in fact, is the particular pattern of outcome/opportunity 
that is associated with the controlled satisfaction of wants or 
needs: the better we get at getting what we want, the better we 
will get at wanting; but the better we get at wanting, the better 
we will get at getting what we want, only we won’t want what 
we get. To get good at getting what we want, we must be left 
continuously wanting. Likewise, the karmic cycle of control 
implicates us in finding ourselves in situations that are not only 
increasingly open to control, but also in apparent need of it. The 
ability readily to determine experiential outcomes leads to a 
systematic depreciation of being where and as we have come to 
be. This, in a nutshell, is what results, karmically, from the 
convenient, choice-rich and control-bestowing consumption of 
globally circulating mass media commodities. There is a point 
beyond which the export of attention from our immediate 
situation brings a mounting degradation of our environment.17  
 
The Buddhist teaching of karma enjoins seeing that 
environments are always ‘mine’ or ‘yours’ or ‘ours.’ As the 
relational understanding of consciousness stresses, we 
ultimately are continuous with—indeed, infused by—our 
environments. Environments are places in which we have a 
place—they are an expression of what we mean by being 
sentient. Consuming mass media is an act of displacement. Mass 
mediation displaces our attention, removes it from where we 
have come to be. Mass media allow locating ourselves 
elsewhere. In doing so, they render contingent—a matter of 
choice—both where we have come to be and who we have come 
to be along the way. The media allow us to choose, 
experientially, where we are and who we are, at the cost of 
reducing our current place to but one among an infinite array of 
locations or spaces that we might occupy if we wish. The natural 
world, once home, becomes a generically shared context for 
                                                          
17 I have discussed at length, elsewhere, how the consumption of 
contemporary mass media qualitatively affects consciousness 
(see, in particular, Reinventing the Wheel, Part III). 
choice. It ceases being the place where, together, we all belong. 
 
Under the regime of consumption that is mandated by the 
market-driven attention economy, there is little time left for 
immediate and sustained appreciation of family and friends, of 
the day’s weather and the advance of the seasons, or of the 
subtle presences that distinguish houses from homes. If there is 
no time for appreciating what is most nearby—the lived 
environments of the home, the community, the village and the 
urban center, but also in the environments within which 
economic and political activity is directly undertaken—there is 
even less time for attending to the natural processes without 
which nothing human ever could have come to be. And, while 
the effects of degraded consciousness will be most apparent in 
the disintegration of homes and neighborhoods and senses of 
felt community, they are ultimately horizonless and affect every 
scale of environment from the most intimate to the most global. 
The looming prospect of human-triggered climate change is a 
singularly troubling case in which qualitatively deficient 
patterns of human consciousness have had a corrosive effect on 
planetary health. 
Bhutanese Public Culture, Environmental 
Conservation and the Media 
It has been argued thus far that errant or troubling patterns of 
relationship have come to obtain among mass media and global 
market economies, resulting in systematic compromises of 
attentive virtuosity and diversity, at every scale, and in every 
domain, of the public sphere. This pattern of compromised 
diversity extends beyond the public sphere to affect even the 
ecological systems comprised in the biosphere as a whole.  
 
Nevertheless, the critical perspective from which this argument 
has been forwarded also allows asking whether there might be a 
scale or depth of media penetration that is compatible with, for 
example, Bhutan’s policy of development committed to the 
promotion of Gross National Happiness (GNH). Is it possible to 
make use of media tools to further the evolution of Bhutanese 
public culture and environmental conservation, without 
opening the Bhutanese population to the neo-colonialism of the 
attention economy? Or, put in more operational terms, how 
does one determine the utility threshold beyond which mass 
media—as complex technological phenomena—begin producing 
the conditions of their own necessity? 
 
The second of these questions is more easily answered. One 
cannot determine, in advance, the precise level of deployment at 
which a technology crosses the threshold of its own utility. It is 
not possible to predict when a technology will begin spawning 
problems of the sort that only it (or related technologies) can 
solve. Technologies are complex phenomena, and while they 
may exhibit quite typical histories or patterns of development, 
they are also capable of behaving in ways that could not have 
been anticipated. There is no amount of empirical data that will 
make it possible to know in advance when mass media will 
cross the line, in any given society, from just providing 
entertainment, news, and a sense of meaning or belonging, to 
generating intensifying needs for (or perceived lacks of) them. 
 
It might be objected that media history, of sufficient scope, can 
surely afford useful insights, if not accurate predictions, in 
regard to the conditions for such a crossover. Unfortunately, 
history never repeats itself precisely. In a world of increasingly 
complex social, economic, political, cultural and technological 
interdependence, it is not just that no particular “history” is ever 
repeated, the very rules of history are being constantly 
rewritten. 
 
The first decades of television consumption that were 
experienced in the U.S. or Europe will never be repeated 
because more recently developed media complexes in other 
societies have simply leapt over them. In many Asian countries, 
for example, cellphones with extended functions like image 
transfer and email capabilities have allowed leapfrogging over 
the era of building extensive land line infrastructure; access to 
television programming by satellite dishes preceded (or made 
irrelevant) antenna-based, national broadcasting; direct 
downloading of music and films from the world-wide-web and 
a vibrant trade in (often bootlegged or illegally reproduced) 
DVDs and VCDs has enabled the mushrooming, virtually 
overnight, of consumer markets across the region that are 
accustomed to viewing the latest Hollywood, Bollywood or 
Hong Kong films within days of their official, theatrical releases. 
 
The postmodern realties of “time-space compression”—most 
incisively analyzed by David Harvey in his book, The Condition 
of Postmodernity— do not, however, only affect macro-level 
phenomena like technology transfer and global flows of 
production/consumption. Compare the sensory diets of the 
present generation of world leaders, born in the 1950s or earlier, 
with that of children today, especially during the first six to 
eight years of life, when basic enculturation and personality 
formation take place. 
 
Consider the effects, first, of a shift from engaging in mass 
media consumption for, at most, a few hours a week to doing so 
a few hours per day, and the associated lack of time spent in 
shared play and other social activities that encourage, not only 
skill in improvised communication, rule-making and joint 
imagination, but also critically appraised reasoning and 
emotional maturation. 
 
Consider, next, the pervasive violence, physical, verbal and 
emotional, that characterizes so much of, for example, so-called 
children’s television.18 Consider the product placement and 
                                                          
18 The average American child, turning eighteen this year, will 
have watched 11,000 murders, killings or rapes in the course of 
his/her life in media consumption. 
consumption cues ingrained in television shows, films, books 
and educational media targeted at young children, as well as the 
quick-cut editing and narrative discontinuities that condition the 
nervous systems of young viewers to anticipate and eventually 
“need” environments in which change is constant, rapid and 
extreme. Finally, consider the computer and on-line games that 
constitute a major global media for children and young people—
media that share all the traits just enumerated and which 
inculcate, in addition, a keen sense of competition and yearning 
for control. 
 
The effects of adding limited mass mediated experiences to the 
sensory diet in the first generations exposed to global mass 
media do not provide a basis for envisioning the effects of 
contemporary media diets on today’s children and youth. The 
only certainty, at present, is that their sensory appetites and 
understandings of meaning and belonging are being 
systematically adapted to meet market imperatives for 
accelerating media consumption and for proportionately 
depreciating engagement with their immediate, natural and 
social environments. 
 
This suggests, at the very least, that Bhutanese public culture 
and environmental policies will be served better by limited the 
overall time spent in media consumption, especially by children 
and youth. The realities of Bhutan’s steady integration into the 
global economy, and its commitment to increasingly democratic 
governance, prohibit accomplishing this by restrictive legislation 
or by technologically constraining choices related to media 
consumption. In fact, any attempt to exert control over the 
public’s consumption of media or other globally circulating 
commodities is likely to have the same ironic consequences that 
are associated with control karma in general—a pattern of 
outcome/opportunity in which mounting capacities for control 
are inseparable from ever more intensely experienced needs for 
control. 
 
What is needed, instead, are policies and practices that will 
enhance the sensitivities and sensibilities needed for the 
Bhutanese people to realize the difference between taking 
advantage of what global media offer and being taken 
advantage of by them. They must, in other words, be well 
enough attuned to their own qualities of consciousness to 
perceive the onset of a relationally degrading hemorrhage  
(asrava) of attention from their own lives and life circumstances, 
and to have the wisdom and moral clarity to respond 
accordingly. This will mean taking the time to make a difference 
in how the relationships constitutive of their immediate 
situation are unfolding, sustainably appreciating or adding-
value to them, becoming, thereby, ever more valuably situated. 
 
There are no set recipes for how to ready the Bhutanese (or any 
other) people to avert the relational and environmental ravages 
of steadily accelerating rates of consumption and the erosion of 
attentive resources needed to service a growing attention 
economy. Public policy responses must themselves be 
improvised in attunement with local conditions, as they have 
come to be. Still, it is possible to specify the overall direction in 
which public policy must move in order to foster the 
sensibilities and sensitivities needed to realize GNH enhancing 
development.  
 
Simply stated, conditions must be created and maintained 
within which each and every member of society is poised to 
offer something distinctively to others. This means sufficiently 
sustaining local ecologies of production to insure that each and 
every person is not becoming increasingly needy—the result of 
capitulation to the demands of market growth that radically 
compress the production-to-waste cycle and that engender 
populations that are in almost continuous states of perceived 
lack or want—but rather increasingly needed. To be a needed 
person is enjoy kusala or virtuosity-developing capacities-for 
and commitments-to contributing to others. It is to enjoy the 
bodhisattva karma of having ever more to offer to others, which 
is also the karma of being ever more richly endowed and 
valuably situated. Public policy must be oriented to the 
accumulation, not of material wealth, but of the noble wealth 
that results from skillfully demonstrating compassion, loving-
kindness, equanimity and joy in the good fortune of others.  
 
Development along these lines involves conserving differences, 
for the purpose of insuring the continued viability of each 
member of a community to truly make a difference. It means 
carefully recognizing the limited value of equality and the 
supervening value of equity or fairness in the context of resolute 
difference, thereby conserving the conditions needed for 
realizing truly robust diversity or innovation-rich mutual 
relevance throughout the public sphere.  
 
One concrete measure that can be taken to create opportunities 
for realizing aesthetically rich and enriching public spaces for 
meeting the basic human needs for education, sensory 
stimulation and a sense of meaning or belonging. Environments 
like this are natural in the sense that they cannot be constructed 
according to preordained plans; instead, they can only emerge 
through the free interplay of those to whom spaces are 
entrusted, within which they can assume an abiding place. The 
privatization of experience and the creation of hybrid 
private/public spaces that are critical elements in the realization 
of a functioning attention economy must be resisted, but, in 
order to be effective, the resistance must take the form of a 
positive expression of common purpose and shared meaning-
making. Some forms of knowledge can be acquired in private. 
Wisdom cannot. And yet, it is wisdom that is needed to promote 
truly sustainable development and the realization of truly 
liberating human and natural environments. 
